CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-LEGISLATIVE
OVERSIGHT ACT VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE-New

Jersey General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438
(1982); NEW JERSEY BUILDING AUTHORITY ACT'S VETO PROVISION
COMPLIES WITH SEPARATION OF POWERS

DOCTRINE-Enourato v.

New Jersey Building Authority, 90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449 (1982).
The legislative veto is a statutory method of obtaining legislative
oversight and control of agency rulemaking.' Since the source of the
Executive's power to promulgate rules emanates from statutes passed
by the legislature, 2 the statutory legislative veto affords the legislature
an opportunity to examine those rules in order to determine whether

they conform to the legislature's intent. This capacity to review rules
devised by the executive branch has been widely disparaged as a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 3 Conversely, the legis-

I

Legislative oversight is the review of the administrative effectuation of legislation in order
to ascertain that agencies are functioning in accordance with statutory guidelines. Ribicoff,
CongressionalOversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 AD. L. REV. 415, 417-18 (1976). Oversight
can assume a number of different forms including a legislative veto, which is the most controversial. Larsen, Legislative Delegation and Oversight: A Promising Approach from Oregon, 14
WILLIAMErE L.J. 1, 12 (1977). The legislative veto has been defined as a 'statutory mechanism
which renders the implementation of executive proposals, advanced in pursuance of statute,
subject to some further form of legislative consideration and control." Cooper & Cooper, The
Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 467 (1962).
Alternative methods to accomplish oversight such as oversight committees, more precise
statutes, and various forms of sunshine and sunset laws are also recognized. Larsen, supra, at 812. Oversight subcommittees work in close conjunction with their corresponding legislative
committees to ensure effectuation of statutory policy. Id. at 9. Increased precision in drafting
statutes has also been suggested as a means of clarifying legislative intent. Id. at 8. Sunshine laws
allow for public scrutiny of legislation and provide for the disclosure of proposed rules in order to
give affected interest groups an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 11. Sunset laws allow for the
expiration of an agency over a set period of time should its usefulness decline. Id. For a complete
discussion of the various methods for legislative oversight, see id. at 6-14.
See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 1, at 482, stating that "the decision power exercised by
the president as chief executive is dependent upon, limited by, and subject to the decisionmaking
power of Congress."
3 See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16
HARV. J. ON LEvis. 735 (1979); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of
Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253 (1982); Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at
Congressional Control of the Executive, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975).
Opponents of the legislative veto argue that since regulations have the force of law, exercise
of the legislative veto results in a change in the law without following constitutional procedures.
Henry, supra, at 740-41. The Executive is not afforded an opportunity to veto the legislature's
decision and accordingly there is a usurpation of executive authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Id.; see also Comment, The Legislative Veto: Is it Legislation?, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 172, 175 (1981). This veto power also permits the legislature to disapprove

550

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:549

lative veto has been vigorously defended as the pragmatic solution to a
lack of agency accountability. 4 Recently, in New Jersey General Assembly v. Byrne5 and its companion case Enourato v. New Jersey
Building Authority," the New Jersey Supreme Court delineated the
state constitutional limits of legislative oversight, 7 holding in General
Assembly that a "broad and absolute legislative veto provision . . .is
both an excessive intrusion into executive enforcement of the law and
an unconstitutional mechanism for legislative policy making beyond
8
the Governor's control."
The General Assembly court invalidated the Legislative Oversight Act 9 which the legislature had passed following three prior
efforts'° to amend the Administrative Procedure Act."1 The Legisla-

a controversial regulatory scheme without having to devise a superior alternative. Martin, supra
note 3, at 268. If, however, the legislature is forced to annul regulations by statute, the legislative
action would possibly be more constructive. Id. at 273. Opponents of the veto also contend that a
series of vetoes by the legislature may leave an agency unsure of the rules it must devise in order
to survive legislative review. Id. at 280; see New Jersey General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376,
387, 448 A.2d 438, 443 (1982) (noting that legislature is not compelled to explain its veto
decision, thus agency is given no enforcement guidance).
The separation of powers doctrine contemplates that the legislative, judicial, and executive
functions will be vested in three separate branches of government, each having distinct repositories of power that cannot be usurped by another. See Fitzgerald, Congressional Oversight or
CongressionalForesight: Guidelinesfrom the Founding Fathers, 28 AD. L. REV. 429, 438 (1976);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J.Madison).
I See, e.g., Cooper & Cooper, supra note 1; Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the
Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978).
Proponents of the legislative veto contend that efficient government operation often demands a broad delegation of authority to agencies and set forth several reasons for implementing
the veto. Larsen, supra note 1, at 2. First, if the legislature delegates authority, it should retain
some control to ensure the effectuation of statutory policy. See id. at 6. Second, the legislature is
often forced to make broad grants of power to an agency and later can review the rules along
with the information gathered by the agency's experts. Martin, supra note 3, at 265-66. Third,
the primary aim of the separation of powers doctrine is not to separate rigidly each branch of
government but to blend power to prevent one branch from usurping the authority of another.
Id. at 262. Fourth, the legislative veto reestablishes the balance of power and accountability to
the public. Id. at 265-66. It counterbalances the broad delegation of power by the legislature
which gives the Executive more power than the framers of the Constitution intended. Id. at 263.
This delegation of power weakens accountability to the public, because legislative decisions are
being made by unelected agency officials. Finally, since a legislative body could potentially strip
agencies of all power by passing very narrow statutes, there should be no objection "to the less
intrusive procedural check of the legislative veto." Id. at 266.
5 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438 (1982).
90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449 (1982).
See supra note 1 for a discussion of legislative oversight.
90 N.J. at 379, 448 A.2d at 439.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52: 14B-4.1 to -4.9 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
'0 90 N.J. at 379, 448 A.2d at 439-40.
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:14B-1 to -15 (West 1970 & Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
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tive Oversight Act provided for legislative review of almost every rule
proposed by state agencies' 2 through the establishment of a standing
reference committee which was to receive proposed rules from the
13
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the General Assembly.
The committee was required to give an evaluation of the rules to the
entire membership of the legislature within forty-five days.' 4 Disapproval of the rules, which would result in their annulment, could be
effectuated through the adoption of a concurrent resolution by both
Houses within sixty days.' 5 Inaction by the legislature would result in
automatic approval of the rules.'
Governor Byrne vetoed the three prior attempts to implement
legislative vetoes applicable to all state agencies as an unconstitutional
infringement on the power of the executive branch.' 7 The fourth
attempt proved to be no exception. Both Houses of the legislature
passed the Legislative Oversight Act by a unanimous vote.' 8 Governor
Byrne, in accordance with his prior stance, vetoed the bill.' 9 The
legislature succeeded in overriding the Governor's veto by attaining
the required two-thirds vote of both Houses. 20 Relying upon the Attorney General's opinion 2' that the Act was unconstitutional, Governor
Byrne advised his cabinet officers to disregard its rulemaking require22
ments.
Following the passage of a concurrent resolution authorizing the
commencement of legal action, the General Assembly and the Senate
individually instituted actions in the Law Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey against Governor Byrne and Howard Kestin,
Director of the Office of Administrative Law, seeking a declaratory
23
judgment that the Legislative Oversight Act was constitutional.
These cases were consolidated and transferred to the appellate diviof New
sion. 24 Before any decision was rendered, the Supreme Court
25
Jersey granted defendants' motion for direct certification.

13

90 N.J. at 380, 448 A.2d at 440.
Id.

Is

Id.

12

Id.
16 Id.
'1 Id. at 379, 448 A.2d at 439-40.
11 Id. at 379-80, 448 A.2d at 439.
"9 Id. at 380, 448 A.2d at 439.
20 Id., 448 A.2d at 440.
21 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 3 (Mar. 10, 1981).
12 90 N.J. at 380, 448 A.2d at 440.
23 Id. at 381, 448 A.2d at 440.
21 Id. "The cases were consolidated pursuant to N.J. CT. R. 4:38-1(a) and transferred to the
appellate division in accordance with N.J. CT. R. 2:2-3(a).'" 90 N.J. at 381, 448 A.2d at 440.
25 90 N.J. at 381, 448 A.2d at 440.
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Justice Pashman, writing for the majority in General Assembly,
held that the Legislative Oversight Act contravened the doctrine of
the separation of powers because it both interfered with the Executive's mandate to execute the law and permitted the legislature to alter
or repeal existing laws in a manner that eliminated participation by
the Governor. 26 The Act was also deemed to violate the presentment
clause2 7 because it abrogated the role of the Governor in changing
legislative policy.2 8 In examining the constitutional complexities involved, the court in General Assembly perceived the legislative veto
broad, and accordingly, expressed its overmechanism to be overly
29
whelming opposition.
The United States Supreme Court was first confronted with the
issue concerning the legitimacy of legislative vetoes in Buckley v.
Valeo. 30 The Court did not pass on the constitutionality of the congressional veto provision which permitted rules promulgated by the
Federal Election Commission to be invalidated, because it held that
the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act governing Commission membership violated the appointments clause. 3' Justice White
argued in his dissent, however, that had members of the Commission
been validly selected, the veto provision would have passed constitu32
tional muster.

Id. at 378-79, 448 A.2d at 439.
CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 14.
21 90 N.J. at 379, 448 A.2d at 439.
21 Id. at 396, 448 A.2d at 449. Five justices participated in the decision. Chief Justice Wilentz
and Justice Handler joined in the opinion delivered by Justice Pashman, while Justices Clifford
and Schreiber concurred in the result.
3 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
"' U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia avoided deciding
the legislative veto's constitutional validity in Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd
mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmett, 431 U.S. 950 (1977), holding that the unicameral veto
provision for rules promulgated by the Federal Election Commission was not ripe for decision
because the veto had not been exercised.
32 Justice White maintained that:
Nothing in the Constitution would prohibit Congress from empowering the Commission to issue rules and regulations without later participation by, or consent of,
the President or Congress with respect to any particular rule or regulation or initially
to adjudicate questions of fact in accordance with a proper interpretation of the
statute. . . . The President must sign the statute creating the rulemaking authority of
the agency or it must have been passed over his veto, and he must have nominated
the members of the agency in accordance with Art. II; but agency regulations issued
in accordance with the statute are not subject to his veto even though they may be
substantive in character and have the force of law.
424 U.S. at 284 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice White, in developing his
argument that a legislative veto does not encroach on presidential power, pointed out that absent
21

21

N.J.
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Atkins v. United States33 is one of the few federal cases which
squarely addressed the constitutionality of a narrowly drawn legislative veto. Federal judges filed suit in Atkins challenging the Salary
Act 34 which made presidential recommendations regarding judicial
salary increases subject to a unicameral legislative veto. 35 The attack
upon the veto provision included allegations that the veto violated the
principle of bicameralism, 36 the presidential veto power,3 7 and the
doctrine of separation of powers. 3' The Atkins court carefully limited
its decision to the facts and emphasized that its determination was not
to be regarded as precedent for legislative vetoes employed in other
contexts.39 In upholding the constitutional validity of the provision by
a narrow majority, the court of claims found no contravention of the
principle of bicameralism. 40 It also decided that there was no violation

congressional disapproval, the regulation would become effective by nonaction and that "this no
more invades the President's powers than does a regulation not required to be laid before
Congress." Id.
11 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
34 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1976).
35 A unicameral provision permits either House of Congress to annul a regulation. At issue in
Atkins was § 359 (1)(B) of the Salary Act which provides that presidential recommendations shall
be effective automatically as long as "neither House of the Congress has enacted legislation
which specifically disapproves all or part of such recommendations." Pursuant to the Salary Act,
the Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries had recommended an increase of
approximately 25% in the salaries of federal judges. Atkins, 556 F.2d at 1041. The President,
however, recommended that judicial salaries be increased by 7.5% per year over the next three
years. Id. The increase was disapproved by the Senate. S. Res. 293, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 120
CONG. REC. 5508 (1974).
11 Bicameralism is embodied in the United States Constitution which provides that "[a]ll
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
It was argued in Atkins that the unicameral veto provisions in the Salary Act violated the
principle of bicameralism which requires that both Houses of Congress participate in the
lawmaking process. 556 F.2d at 1062. The court dismissed this argument and held the unicameral provision to be a legitimate form of supervision in this context. Id. at 1063; see infra note
40 and accompanying text.
31 The plaintiffs argued that the one House veto provision permitted Congress to effect a
change in the law without presentment to the President. 556 F.2d at 1063. The court found this
argument unpersuasive and held that the one House veto functioned to preserve the status quo.
Id. The court held that the wage recommendations of the President do not have the force of law.
A veto, therefore, only invalidates a proposal and does not result in the repeal of a law.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the recommendations only have the force of law if neither
House disapproves of them within thirty days.
IId. at 1066-67.
o See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
0 556 F.2d at 1028. In support of this conclusion, the court cited other exceptions to the
requirement of bicameral action in fulfilling the legislative function. For example, impeachment, approval of appointments, and treaties, as well as a determination of its own rules are
constitutional grants of authority made to one House. Id. at 1062. Additionally, the court
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of the separation of powers doctrine under the maxim that a certain
amount of blending of power among the three branches is necessary in
order to govern effectively. 4' Finally, in dismissing the attack on the
provision as a violation of the presentment clause, 42 the court observed
that other provisions of the Salary Act gave the President an opportunity to participate in the wage recommendation process and therefore
43
concluded that the clause's purpose had been preserved.
Two years later, in Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization
Service,44 the Ninth Circuit invalidated the House of Representatives'
veto of an executive decision made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service under the Immigration and Nationality Act 45 to suspend an alien's deportation. 46 In Chadha, the court focused on
whether Congress had interfered with either the Executive's mandate
to execute the law or the judicial power to review cases and controversies in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 47 The court
rejected three possible justifications for the one House veto provision.
First, the court stated that the use of the veto to correct an erroneous
decision by the Immigration and Naturalization Service allowing
Chadha to stay in the United States interfered with the judiciary's

maintained that Congress can pass resolutions which are exempt from a presidential veto even
though this power is not expressly included in the Constitution. Id. In accordance with these
exceptions to bicameralism, the Atkins court found the unicameral veto provision of the Salary
Act constitutional. Id.
41 Id. at 1066-67. The court found the provisions not to be an interference with a power it
had delegated to the Executive; rather it found that "in exercising delegated functions, the
executive officer merely acts as an agent of the legislative branch of Government." Id. at 1068.
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3, the presentment clause, provides in pertinent part:
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House
of Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or
being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a
Bill.
11 556 F.2d at 1065.
- 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981).
45 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
46 556 F.2d at 411. This case involved Jagdish Rai Chadha, a native of Kenya,
who was of
deportable status. An inquiry officer of the executive branch of Government had determined
that Chadha should be permitted to stay in the United States in order to avoid "extreme
hardship," a statutory exception to deportation provided for in the Immigration and Nationality
Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1)(1976). Subsequently, the House of Representatives adopted a
resolution pursuant to the veto provision, id. § 1254(c)(2) (1976), which disapproved the suspension of deportation proceedings. Chadha was unsuccessful in appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals and sought redress in the courts. 556 F.2d 411.
11 556 F.2d at 421.
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central function of review. 4 Second, the court determined that Congress' effort to share in the implementation of the statute undermined
the power of the Executive to execute the law. 40 Third, the court
dismissed an attempt to validate the veto as an exercise of residual
legislative power since such action by the legislature would unnecessarily disrupt the operation of the coordinate branches. 50 While conceding that Congress does have the power to deport all aliens, the
court concluded that this does not encompass the power to deport an
individual alien by means of a legislative veto because the mechanism
interfered with the right to a fair hearing.5 ' The court therefore held
that a veto of the agency's decision permitting Chadha to stay in the
52
United States violated his due process rights.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in Consumer Energy v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,53 that a one
House veto provision incorporated into the Natural Gas Policy Act 54

11 Id. at 431. The court found that Congress should not be permitted to revise agency rulings
since this responsibility is normally conferred upon the judicial branch. Id.
11 Id. The court concluded that the legislature had invalidated a reasoned executive decision
without specifying how the Executive had failed in its responsibility to effectuate legislative
policy. The court determined that such action was "both disruptive and unnecessary to the sound
administration of the law." Id. at 432.
-o Id. at 434. The executive branch had decided that deportation of Chadha would result in
undue hardship on the alien. Id. at 432. The judicial branch had the authority to review this
decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 431 n.32. Any subsequent veto by the
legislature, therefore, would diminish the power of these coordinate branches. Id. at 434.
51

Id.

The court maintained that because of the disapproval mechanism,
[a]liens are no longer guaranteed the constraints of the articulated reasons and stare
decisis in the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Adjudications
they have obtained in the judicial branch may be set aside for any reason, or no
reason at all, so that judicial decisions may be for naught. This effect, the potential
nullification of judicial attempts to require uniform application of the statute by the
Executive, has an indirect effect upon all aliens who must rely on an administrative
application of the statute in the first instance.
Id. at 431.
In the hierarchy of reasons used to invalidate the one House veto of Chadha's deportation
suspension, therefore, a deep concern for the abrogation of Chadha's due process rights is of the
highest order. Comment, Limiting the Legislative Veto: Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1721, 1730 (1981). Consequently, the holding in Chadha has
been interpreted to be relevant only in situations where a legislative veto's implementation could
affect due process interests. Id.; Martin, supra note 3, at 261 n.22.
s- 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
54 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. IV 1980). In accordance with the Act, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) was to promulgate rules to implement an incremental pricing
program which would place part of the increased price resulting from deregulation of natural
gas on industrial users instead of residential consumers. Id. § 3342(b)(1), (2). The Act further
required that FERC submit the rules to Congress, id. § 33 42(c)(1), where a majority of either
House could disapprove the rules by resolution. Id. § 3342(c)(1). In Consumer Energy, the House
52
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was unconstitutional. 55 The court found both Atkins and Chadha to
be of minimal assistance in reaching its decision 56 because it determined that these cases were limited to their facts and thus should be
viewed as inappropriate precedent for future determinations regarding the validity of legislative veto provisions. 57 The Consumer Energy
court rejected the argument that the provision could be validated
under the necessary and proper clause, 5 noting that although Congress had the power to enact such a veto provision, it was not "proper"
59
because it contained other constitutional defects.
The first defect found by the court in Consumer Energy was a
violation of article I, section 7 of the United States Constitution which
describes the formal requirements of the lawmaking process.60 The
of Representatives disapproved FERC's rules. 673 F.2d at 433. The Consumer Energy Council of
America then filed suit seeking to have the veto provision invalidated. Id. at 433-34.
11 673 F.2d at 434.
16 See id. at 451.
57 For example, the Atkins court maintained that "[o]ur consideration must center
then, on
this specific mechanism in this specific statute . . . and there will be no attempt to suggest or
forecast the fate of other situations or other statutes." 556 F.2d at 1059.
Similarly, the court in Chadha said:
[W]e are not here faced with a situation in which the unforeseeability of future
circumstances or the broad scope and complexity of the subject matter of an agency's
rulemaking authority preclude the articulation of specific criteria in the governing
statute itself. Such factors might present considerations different from those we find
here, both as to the question of separation of powers and the legitimacy of the
unicameral device.
634 F.2d at 433 (footnotes omitted).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 gives Congress the power "to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."
51 673 F.2d at 455. In Consumers Union v. Federal Trade Commission, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (en bane), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided
that a legislative veto provision included in the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. IV
1980)), was unconstitutional. 691 F.2d at 577-78. Sitting en bane, the circuit court adopted the
rationale of Consumer Energy to support its conclusion. The Act provided that the Federal
Trade Commission must submit proposed rules to Congress for review. 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(a)
(Supp. IV 1980). The rule would be effective after 90 days unless Congress passed a concurrent
resolution of disapproval. Id. § 57a-l(d). The FTC promulgated a rule which required dealers to
place stickers on used cars disclosing whether a warranty was being offered and listing any
important mechanical defects of which the dealer was informed. See 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328-78
(1981); 47 CONsuMER REPoRTs 385 (1982). Heavy lobbying by the Political Action Committee of
the National Automobile Dealers Association ensued. Id. When the FTC submitted the rule
pursuant to the Act, Congress vetoed the rule. See S. Con. Res. 60, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. S 5402 (daily ed. May 18, 1982).
60 673 F.2d at 457. The Constitution describes the lawmaking process in two clauses of
article I. One clause provides that: "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The other clause provides that: "Every Order,
Resolution, or Vote, to which the Concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives
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court determined that regulations have the force of law6 and that 62if
the law is to be altered, constitutional procedures must be followed.
The one House veto provision violated this process since it circumvented the requirement of presentation to the President and operated
in contravention of the principle of bicameralism. 6 3 The second flaw
discovered by the court was the provision's interference with the
separation of powers doctrine because it resulted in a shared administration between the legislative and executive branches.6 4 The court
therefore concluded that the unicameral veto of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission regulations operated as an unconstitutional
65
change in the law.
Like the federal courts, state courts have denounced the validity
of legislative vetoes under their own constitutions. 6 6 The holdings in68
7
State v. A.L.I. V.E. Voluntary and State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin
are indicative of this trend. In State v. A.L.I. V.E., the Alaska Supreme Court rendered unconstitutional a statute permitting the legislature to annul any regulation of an agency or department by concurrent resolution.6 9 The court rejected the argument that the legislature
could reserve a portion of the power it had delegated to state agencies,
70
and concluded that the conditional grant of power was unlawful.
The majority also found unpersuasive the contention that legislative

U.S. CONST.
may be necessary. . . shall be presented to the President of the United States.
art 1, § 7, cl. 3.
61 673 F.2d at 465; see also State v. Atlantic City Elec. Co., 23 N.J. 259, 270, 128 A.2d 861,
867 (1957); Rutgers Council v. New Jersey Bd. of Higher Educ., 126 N.J. Super. 53, 312 A.2d
677 (App. Div. 1973).
62 673 F.2d at 465.
63 Id. at 464-65.
IId. at 474.
65 Id. It was argued that the agency rule was merely a proposal which could be subjected to a
one House veto in the same way that proposed legislation can be rejected by one House. The
court found this argument untenable, however, since it concluded that the veto actually changed
the law. The veto, reasoned the court, prevented a regulation from taking effect and thus
diminished the breadth of the FERC's discretion. But see Atkins 556 F.2d at 1063 (one House
legislative veto does not change law but rather preserves status quo).
66 See State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1980); Opinion of the
Justices, 96 N.H. 517, 83 A.2d 738 (1950) (provision allowing disapproval of Governor's reorganization plans by concurrent resolution held violative of New Hampshire Constitution's enactment
procedures and presentment clause); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va.
Sup. Ct. App. 1981). But see Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218
P.2d 498 (1950) (en bane) (concurrent legislative resolution approving highway funds does not
require presentment to Governor).
67 606 P.2d 769 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1980).
66 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1981).
66 606 P.2d at 770.
70 Id. at 777. The court stated: "The fact that it [the legislature] can delegate legislative
power to others who are not bound by [state constitutional enactment procedures] . . . does not

558

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:549

oversight could promote government efficiency and held that efficiency is no reason to suspend constitutional requirements. 7' State ex
rel. Barker v. Manchin also dealt with a broadly applicable legislative
veto provision. In Manchin, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals invalidated a statute which created a legislative rulemaking
review committee empowered to review any regulations promulgated
by state agencies. 72 The court held that the provision violated the
separation of powers principle since it permitted the legislature to
exercise power belonging to the Executive. 73 The court, adopting the
A.L.I.V.E. rationale, concluded that the legislature was in effect
giving itself the power to devise regulations having the force of law
without following state constitutional enactment procedures. 74 The
court in Manchin, however, pointed out that its invalidation of the
statute in question did not mean that all legislative review of agency
rules is unconstitutional. 75 It only required that the method be consti7
tutional . 6
The General Assembly decision comported with prior determinations which held the legislative veto unconstitutional. Justice Pashman
initially focused on the historical purposes of the separation of powers
doctrine and the presentment clause. 77 In discussing separation of
powers, he noted that the doctrine emphasized that a "concentration
of governmental power increases the potential for oppression, and
that fragmentation of power helps ensure its temperate use." 78 In
support of the latter contention, the court stressed that the separation
of powers was incorporated into the Federal Constitution to ensure

mean that it can delegate the same power to itself, and in the process escape from the constraints
under which it must operate." Id. (footnotes omitted).
Ild. at 778-79.
The A.L.I.V.E. dissent strenuously objected to the majority's holding that agency regulations are equivalent to laws. Id. at 780 (Boochever, J., dissenting). Justice Boochever noted that
the constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws are not applicable to regulations. He
stated:
In my opinion, the majority reasoning is fallacious in equating regulations with laws
passed by the legislature. The litany of constitutional requirements outlined in the
majority opinion is indeed mandated for the passage of a bill into law. The constitution, however, makes none of those requirements applicable to regulations.
Id. The dissent, therefore, found it anomalous that agency regulations could only be invalidated
in the same manner as laws. Id.
11 279 S.E.2d at 626-27.
11 Id. at 633.
74 Id. at 633-34.
75 Id. at 634.
"I Id. at 635.
17 90 N.J. at 381, 448 A.2d at 440.
78

Id.
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that one branch of Government would not encroach on another. 79
Despite this creation of three separate branches of Government by the
framers of the Constitution, the General Assembly court stated that
the separation of powers did not require each branch to completely
sever all ties with its coordinate branches. 80 Justice Pashman also
found that the role of the courts in this system was to monitor any
interplay among the branches and to prevent the abuse of one branch
by another.81
The GeneralAssembly court noted that the New Jersey Constitu82
tion expressly incorporated a provision for the separation of powers
that paralleled the structural divisions in Government embodied in
the Federal Constitution.8 3 The court observed that the framers were
particularly concerned that the legislature would use its law making
power to undercut the authority of coordinate branches.8 4 Justice
Pashman stated that the separation of powers doctrine requires that
the courts preclude legislative overreaching in two ways. First, the
courts must enforce constitutional restraints on the legislature's ability
to make laws, and second, the courts must ensure that the legislature
does not encroach upon the Executive's duty to execute the law. 5

19Id.

(citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); T.
120 (W. Peden ed. 1955)); see THE FEDERALIST No.
47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossitor ed. 1961), which states that the "accumulation of all power,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny." For a complete discussion regarding the separation of powers doctrine
and its origins in the Federal Constitution, see Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An
Introduction to the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 435 (1974).
80 90 N.J. at 382, 448 A.2d at 440 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); In re
Salaries Probation Officers, 58 N.J. 422, 425, 278 A.2d 417, 418 (1971)).
JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

81

Id.

N.J. CONST. art. III, § I provides: "The powers of the government shall be divided among
three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to
or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the
others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution."
83 90 N.J. at 382, 448 A.2d at 441.
84 Id. at 383, 448 A.2d at 441; see THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309-10 U. Madison) (C.
82

Rossitor ed. 1961) which states:
The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. . . . Its constitutional powers being at
once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the greater
facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which
it makes on the co-ordinate departments.
Id.
8590 N.J. at 383, 448 A.2d at 442.
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The separation of powers doctrine, according to the court, also
embodies the Executive's power to veto legislation.8 6 In examining the
purpose of an executive veto, the GeneralAssembly court found that it
prevented the legislature from exercising excessive lawmaking power
and that it precluded interference with the executive branch. 87 Justice
Pashman reviewed the history of the New Jersey Constitution's presentment clause, 88 in which the Executive veto is contained, and noted
that the clause's development reflected an increase of the Executive's
veto power.8 9 Therefore, he reasoned that a violation of the presentment clause occurred whenever the Governor's option to veto legislation was circumvented.9 0 Nevertheless, Justice Pashman stated that
the countervailing principle of cooperation among the coordinate
branches mandated a consideration of the practical effects of the
Legislative Oversight Act on enforcement of the law and lawmaking
to determine its constitutionality. 9'
The General Assembly court first addressed the ways in which
the Legislative Oversight Act interfered with the Executive's enforcement of the law and determined that the Act permitted the legislature
to control agency rulemaking, thereby disrupting agencies in their
execution of the law. 92 The very purpose of allowing agencies to
promulgate rules, observed the court, was to ensure that legislation
was effected through coherent regulatory schemes. 93 Justice Pashman
indicated that once the legislature delegates power to the Executive it

s Id. at 384, 448 A.2d at 442.
Id.; see THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (A. Hamilton).
88 90 N.J. at 384, 448 A.2d at 442. The presentment clause of the New Jersey Constitution
provides:
Every bill which shall have passed both houses shall be presented to the Governor.
If he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections, to the
house in which it shall have originated . . . . If. . . two-thirds of all the members of
the house of origin shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections of the Governor, to the other house, by which it shall be reconsidered and
if approved by two-thirds of all the members of that house, it shall become a
law ....
N.J. CONST. art. V, § 7, para. 14.
88 90 N.J. at 384, 448 A.2d at 442. The New Jersey Constitution originally did not contain an
executive veto provision. See N.J. CONST. of 1776. The 1844 Constitution contained an executive
veto provision, N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 7 (1844) (amended 1947), which was broadened to its
present form in the 1947 Constitution to increase executive authority. See 5 PROCEEDINGS: NEW
JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, at 66, 461.
1o 90 N.J. at 385, 448 A.2d at 443.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93

Id. at 386, 448 A.2d at 443.
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is precluded from interference in the exercise of that power94 since
such interference could destroy the cohesiveness of a regulatory
scheme.9 5 Further, he noted that the Legislative Oversight Act permitted the legislature to nullify either segments of or an entire regulatory
scheme. 6 The General Assembly court determined that nullifying
parts of a regulatory scheme could result in the remainder of the
statute operating in contravention of its initial goals or without any
rational purpose at all.9 7 Additionally, since the legislature was not
required to explain its decision, the court found that the agency would
have no guidelines for establishing alternative regulatory programs.9 8
Justice Pashman decided that legislative interference with the Executive's implementation of the law also could force agency officials to
abandon their duties, since repeated exercise of the veto would paralyze an agency.9 9 He surmised that this would encourage agencies to
engage in rulemaking aimed at appeasing the legislature thereby further usurping executive power. 100 Concluding his analysis of the legislative veto's practical effect upon law enforcement, Justice Pashman
held that the decision did not preclude every use of a legislative veto.
Its condemnation was confined to the broad veto contained in the
Legislative Oversight Act. 10' Since the veto in the Act was applicable

Id. (citing Cooper & Cooper, supra note 1, at 488). It should be noted, however, that
Cooper and Cooper continued with an analysis of this argument and rejected it, stating that:
[T]he argument is that apart from whether power is inherently executive or legislative, once Congress has delegated by law a task to the executive, it cannot interfere
subsequently in the performance of that task. This argument becomes less than
convincing when two points are remembered. The first is that nothing happens
substantively or qualitatively to the power given to the executive which renders it
improperly legislative just because it has been given to the executive. There is
nothing sacred about the fact that certain decision-making powers have been given
to the executive; the decisions involved remain proper subjects for legislative action
whenever the legislature chooses to exercise the power once more. Second, when
compared with Congress' other oversight weapons, the veto is not basically distinguishable on procedural grounds. It cannot be condemned either because it interferes in the administrative process or because the interference it institutes differs in
kind or effect from Congress' other oversight mechanisms.
Cooper & Cooper, supra note 1, at 488 (footnote omitted).
11 90 N.J. at 386, 448 A.2d at 443.
96 Id.
94

07

Id.

11 Id. at 387, 448 A.2d at 443.
Id., 448 A.2d at 444.
I1
100Id.
101 Id. 'In other contexts legislative cooperation or sharing of powers may be essential to
further a statute's purpose. Id. The court cited its decision in Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg.
Auth., 90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449 (1982), as an example of a constitutionally permissible exercise
of veto power.
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to every state agency, Justice Pashman found it to be an exercise of
executive power by the legislature on a routine basis, and thus a
10 2
patent violation of separation of powers.
In the second part of its analysis of the practical effects of the
Act's legislative veto, the court considered the use of the veto as a
mechanism for the legislature to exceed its constitutional lawmaking
power.1 0 3 Justice Pashman found that the veto allowed the legislature
to block rules authorized by statute, and therefore, effectively resulted
in the amendment or repeal of legislation without presentment to the
Governor. 104 He held that this05violated both the separation of powers
and the presentment clauses. 1
The court, citing a New Jersey case, In re New York Susquehanna & Western Railroad,10 reasoned that absent presentment to
the Governor, legislative power was limited.10 7 The Susquehanna
court found that passage of a legislative resolution announcing a
policy against the discontinuance of rail service while the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners considered the railroad's application to
suspend service, did not have the effect of a law since it had not been
presented to the Governor. Thus, it operated solely as an expression of
opinion.10 8 Applying this rationale, the General Assembly court decided that the concurrent resolution in the Legislative Oversight Act
operated to change the law by nullifying agency rules in violation of
the constitutional requirement of presentment. 0 9
Justice Pashman next reviewed the case law outside of New Jersey
finding support for his position in Consumer Energy v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in which the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia invalidated a congressional veto of Federal Energy Commission rules." 0 He pointed out that the Consumer Energy
court rejected the argument that the veto operated as a congressional
refusal to enact proposed legislation, and therefore was a valid exercise of lawmaking power."' Justice Pashman found further support

102

General Assembly, 90 N.J. at 388, 448 A.2d at 444.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

25 N.J. 343, 136 A.2d 408 (1957).
90 N.J. at 388, 448 A.2d at 444.
108 25 N.J. at 348, 136 A.2d at 411.
100 90 N.J. at 389, 448 A.2d at 445.
1t0 See Consumer Energy, 673 F.2d at 434.
106
107

M 90 N.J. at 390, 448 A.2d at 445.
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2
for his rejection of the veto in the state court decisions of Manchin 11
and A.L.I. V.E.113 Justice Pashman noted that these decisions found
broad legislative vetoes 4violative of constitutionally established procedures for lawmaking."
The court also discounted the argument that the Legislative
Oversight Act was constitutional because it passed in compliance with
the requirements of the presentment clause." 5 Justice Pashman commented that a government could not act in a manner which allowed it
to ignore constitutional lawmaking procedures in the future. 11 6 Applying this rule to General Assembly, he concluded that "the Legislature
cannot pass an act that allows it to violate the Constitution."11 7 Although the General Assembly court concluded that the veto gave the
legislature excessive lawmaking power it noted that some uses of the
veto in the Legislative Oversight Act would encourage the executive
and legislative branches to work together to further statutory
schemes. 11 8 While recognizing the principle of cooperation, the court
held that this did not render the act constitutional since it had other
flaws. The court reiterated its position that the broad veto power of
the Legislative Oversight Act gave the legislature the potential to
intrude on the executive branch in violation of the separation of
powers and presentment clauses.""
The court next examined the prevalence of administrative agencies in modern government. The court observed that "[m]any agency
regulations differ little in their scope and effect from legislative commands."'' 2 0 It further recognized that every administrative agency
derives its power from the legislature, hence the legislature possesses
the power to restrict or abrogate the agency's authority. 121 If the
legislature decides not to take away the agency's authority, the General Assembly court indicated that there were other ways to control
agency activity in order to prevent the abuses which the Legislative
22
Oversight Act sought to correct.1

279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1981).
ll 606 P.2d 769 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1980).
"' 90 N.J. at 391, 448 A.2d at 446.

.. 2

11

Id.

I8 (citing Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 72 N.J. 412, 371 A.2d 34 (1977)).
Id.
Id.
"8 Id. at 392, 448 A.2d at 447.
11 Id.
"2 Id. at 393, 448 A.2d at 447.
117

121 Id.
122 Id. at 393-94, 448 A.2d at 448. The court specifically mentioned oversight committees as
one method of controlling agencies.
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Justice Pashman again indicated that this decision did not totally
foreclose use of the legislative veto. 123 He pointed out that the court's
decision in Brown v. Heymann 2 4 upheld the constitutionality of the
Executive Reorganization Act which contained a veto provision. That
Act provided that an executive reorganization plan prepared by the
Governor would be deemed effective unless a concurrent resolution
disapproving the plan was passed within sixty days. 12 5 The General
Assembly court found that, unlike this case, the court in Brown had
been primarily concerned with the question whether the power of the
Executive was unconstitutionally increased rather than decreased by
this delegation of authority to the legislature. 126 Justice Pashman also
noted that on the federal level, control over appropriations challenged
in Atkins, which were subject to a legislative veto, have also been held
27
to be valid.1
While the General Assembly court did not preclude every exercise of a legislative veto provision, it pronounced the Legislative Oversight Act to be excessively broad. 2 8 The court indicated, however,
that given the appropriate context, legislative participation in the
execution of the laws would be permissible. 129 It concluded that when
"legislative action is necessary to further a statutory scheme requiring
cooperation between the two branches, and such action offers no
substantial potential to interfere with exclusive executive functions or
alter the statute's purposes, legislative veto power can pass constitutional muster." 130
This line of reasoning was borne out in the companion case,
Enourato v. New Jersey Building Authority,' 3' where the court upheld the constitutionality of legislative veto provisions applicable to
projects proposed by the New Jersey Building Authority (Authority). 132 The New Jersey Building Authority Act 33 created the Authority for the express purpose of constructing and maintaining offices for
state agencies. 134 The Act provided two checks on all actions of the

123 Id.
121

at 394, 448 A.2d at 448.
62 N.J. 1, 297 A.2d 527 (1972).
90 N.J. at 394, 448 A.2d at 448.

126

Id.

.24

127 Id. at 394 n.4, 448 A.2d at 448 n.4.

IId. at 395, 448 A.2d at 448.
129
130

Id.
Id.

90 N.J. 396, 448 A.2d 449 (1982).
Id. at 399, 448 A.2d at 450.
133 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-78.1 to .32 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
131 90 N.J. at 399, 448 A.2d at 450.
131
132
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Authority: first, the Authority had to receive the approval of the
Governor before taking any action, 35 and second, the act contained
two legislative veto provisions. 1 31 One provision permitted a legislative
veto of the Authority's projects which exceeded a projected cost of
$100,000137 and another required all leases between the Authority and
a state agency to be approved by the Speaker of the Assembly and the
138
President of the Senate.
Pursuant to the Act, the Authority obtained legislative approval
to undertake various building projects. Completion of the project
could eliminate the need for the state to continue to rent from certain
land owners. Albert Enourato, a property owner, whose land had
been leased to the state 39 brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the required legislative approval for any project in excess of
$100,000 and the power to veto lease agreements by the presiding
officer of each House of the legislature. 40 Enourato contended that
the option of the legislature to strike down these projects violated the
separation of powers provision, the presentment clause, and the debt
142
limitations clause 4 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.
Enourato commenced the action one day prior to the anticipated
execution of a contract for the sale of $135,000,000 worth of bonds for
a particular building project. The trial court dismissed the action
finding no constitutional violations. 43 Following affirmation by the
appellate division, 44 the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted and
45
accelerated Enourato's appeal.
Before examining the constitutionality of the veto provisions contained in the Building Authority Act, Justice Pashman in his majority
opinion reiterated the holding in General Assembly. 146 He determined
that the veto provision in General Assembly contravened the separation of powers because it gave the legislature the authority to rescind
most agency rules and thus interfered with the Executive's power to

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-78.4(i) (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
90 N.J. at 399, 448 A.2d at 450.
117 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:18A-78.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
38 Id. § :18A-78.9.
90 N.J. at 399-400, 448 A.2d at 450.
140 Id. at 398, 448 A.2d at 450.
1
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, para. 3. For a discussion of the court's disposition of this
argument, see infra note 169.
142 90 N.J. at 398-99, 448 A.2d at 450.
143 Id. at 400, 448 A.2d at 451.
144 See Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 182 N.J. Super. 58, 440 A.2d 42 (App. Div.
1981), af'd, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438 (1982).
145 90 N.J. at 400, 448 A.2d at 451.
146 Id.
135
138
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enforce the law. 147 That veto violated both the separation of powers
and the presentment clauses because it gave the legislature the power
to change the law without presentment to the Governor.1 48 The
Enourato court emphasized, however, that General Assembly did not
preclude all legislative input into the Executive's enforcement of the
law and did not mandate conformance with the presentment clause
for actions that were not lawmaking. 14 Based on this premise, the
majority held that the Building Authority Act incorporated an appropriate method for the legislature to oversee acts of the Executive, and
1 50
thus was constitutional.
The Enourato court initially focused on the veto provisions contained in the Building Authority Act and decided that they advanced
the implementation of coherent regulatory schemes for two reasons.'15
First, Justice Pashman noted that exercising the option not to veto a
project in its preliminary phases would provide the legislature with a
strong incentive for the continuance of monetary appropriations in the
future.152 Second, he indicated that use of the veto facilitated cooperation between the legislative and executive branches and assured that
the Authority would exercise "fiscal prudence" in the selection of
costly projects. 5 3 The court found that under the present circumstances an approval of a building project or lease "lock[ed] the legislature .. .into making continued appropriations"'' 54 while projects of
other agencies could be more easily discontinued by the legislature. 55
Justice Pashman then discussed the limited effect of the Building
Authority Act's veto provisions on the separation of powers principle
and found them to be distinguishable from the General Assembly veto
in three ways. 56 First, he decided that the Governor's complete power
over the initial choice of projects precluded usurpation of executive
power because the legislature would only obtain the opportunity to

147 Id.
141

Id. at 400-01, 448 A.2d at 451.

'49

Id.

1'0 Id.
'51
152

Id.
Id.

at 403, 448 A.2d at 452.

1-1 Id., 448 A.2d at 452-53.
"5 Id. at 404, 448 A.2d at 453.
151 Id. For this reason the majority disagreed with the dissent's argument that the Building
Authority Act's veto provisions would apply to any executive agency which required continuing
legislative appropriations.
"I Id. at 405, 448 A.2d at 453.
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veto a project after it had been approved by the Governor.1 57 The
majority found that the Building Authority Act could be distinguished
from the Legislative Oversight Act, because it permitted more exten58
sive executive participation.1
The second distinction discovered by the court was that the veto
power was limited to disapproval of individual building projects and
leases, and therefore had a reduced ability to disrupt acts by the
Executive. 5 9 Justice Pashman noted that the Building Authority Act's
veto provisions gave the legislature the power either to veto a whole
project or to allow it to continue, but did not permit the legislature to
nullify portions of regulatory schemes, thus keeping disruption to a
minimum. 6 0 He also stated that although the legislature could reduce
action by the Authority through the frequent use of vetoes, it could
not force the Authority to put forth projects on exclusively legislative
terms since the Executive could veto any agency action.'"'
The final distinguishing factor noted by the Enourato court was
that using the veto many times would not change "legislative intent in
ways that require presentment to the Governor." 162 The majority
found that the veto provisions served the purpose of retaining "tight
control" over the initiation of building projects and leases. 63 Justice
Pashman decided that although the legislative veto allowed the legislature to disapprove of a project that a prior legislature might have
approved, this action is not the same as nullifying an existing law.1 64
The court determined that the remote potential for continuous use of
the veto provisions which might disable the Authority from beginning
any project, did not warrant the invalidation of vetoes which "served
65
an important governmental purpose."

"I Id. This procedure, which allows the Governor to submit to the legislature only proposals
which he approves, is termed "reverse legislation." Watson, supra note 2, at 1072. The technique
is viewed as an acceptable mechanism since the Executive has retained his veto power in
determining which proposed rules will be submitted for approval by the legislative body. Id.
158 90 N.J. at 405, 448 A.2d at 453. The court cited Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 297 A.2d
572 (1972), in support of this proposition. Justice Pashman also noted the constitutional irrelevance of the dissent's efforts to distinguish Brown because it involved the legislature's use of the
veto to thwart acts of the Executive rather than allowing the Executive to act only after
legislative approval. In both cases, reasoned the court, the ability of the legislature to block
executive actions is the same. 90 N.J. at 406 n.1, 448 A.2d at 454 n.1.
15990 N.J. at 406, 448 A.2d at 454.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162

Id.

163

Id.

at 407, 448 A.2d at 454.

164

Id.
1"5 Id.,

448 A.2d at 454-55.
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The Enourato majority expressed concern that the unicameral
and one person veto provisions in the Building Authority Act could
violate the "principles of bicameralism." 66 The court noted that only
one House of the legislature was required to veto proposed building
projects and that individual officers of each house could veto lease
agreements, thereby increasing the concentration of legislative
power. 6 7 In spite of this, Justice Pashman asserted that "[t]he more
limited the grant of power, the more concentrated it can be without
violating the Presentment Clause or the separation of powers. ' ' os
Since the power given in this case was strictly confined to providing
"'additionalchecks" on Authority actions, he concluded that the veto
69
provisions in question were constitutional.1
70
Justice Schreiber, in a dissenting and concurring opinion,
maintained that the veto provisions in the Building Authority Act
were unconstitutional under the test outlined in General Assembly. 17'
He gave three reasons for this conclusion. First, the dissent found that
the veto provisions impermissibly interfered with the Executive's mandate to execute the law in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. 72 Second, Justice Schreiber decided that the one House veto

"I6Id. at 408, 448 A.2d at 455; cf. Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. S. Ct.
1981) (shifting of legislative power to such small groups in either house cannot fairly be said to
represent legislative will).
167 90 N.J. at 408, 448 A.2d at 455.
168 Id. at 409, 448 A.2d at 455.
169 Id., 448 A.2d at 455. Justice Pashman also dismissed the plaintiff's contention that debts of
the Authority were debts of the State and thus the debt limitations clause of the New Jersey
Constitution had been contravened. Id. at 409, 448 A.2d at 455. He decided that since the
projects and lease agreements were a debt of the Authority, no liability of the State would ensue
if the Authority defaulted on payments and thus the debt limitations clause did not apply. Id. at
410, 448 A.2d at 455. In pertinent part the court stated: "The Authority's bonds and notes are
not a debt of liability of the State. They state on their face that the State does not pledge its faith
and credit to their payment. . . [and therefore] [t]he Authority's creditors have notice that their
only remedy lies against the Authority." Id., 448 A.2d at 456.
'0
Justice Clifford joined in the concurring and dissenting opinion.
90 N.J. at 411, 448 A.2d at 456-57 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring).
172 Id., 448 A.2d at 456 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring). Drawing on the majority
opinion in General Assembly, Justice Schreiber reiterated the twofold test of a violation of that
doctrine: "'unwarranted legislative interference with the executive branch and excessive legislative law making power.' Id. at 413, 448 A.2d at 458 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring).
Applying this test to the Building Authority Act veto provisions, he found that they violated the
separation of powers in two ways. First, the dissent noted that the vetoes at issue in Enourato
resulted in extensive legislative control of the Authority's purpose for existence since even though
the Authority had the power to determine the feasibility of a proposed project, no plan could
proceed without legislative approval. Id. at 414, 448 A.2d at 458 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and
concurring). Second, Justice Schreiber decided that the legislature's option to discontinue financing the Authority failed to justify an interference with executive function through the veto
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73
provision was a contravention of the principle of bicameralism.1
Finally, he determined that the vetoes allowed the legislature to effect
a change in the law without presentment to the Governor, in violation
of the presentment clause.174 Justice Schreiber decided, however, that
the veto provisions were severable from the remainder of the statute,
and hence the Authority was competent to go forward with its activities. '75
The General Assembly court found the Legislative Oversight Act
unconstitutional because its broad scope both interfered with executive functions in violation of the separation of powers clause and
empowered the legislature to annul rules without presentment to the
Governor in contravention of the presentment clause. 7 7 The court
stressed, however, that its determination did not preclude the use of
legislative vetoes in all contexts 77 and formulated a test for determin-

provisions since current legislative approval did not "'lock the Legislature, for all practical
purposes, into making continued appropriations"' in the future. Id. at 414-15, 448 A.2d at 458.
(Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring) (quoting id. at 404, 448 A.2d at 453).
Id. at 411,448 A.2d at 456 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring). Because either house
had the power to veto proposed projects costing in excess of $100,000, the dissent maintained
that the constitutional requirement that both houses approve all bills was contravened. Id. at
416, 448 A.2d at 459 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring). Justice Schreiber also objected to
the provision in the Act requiring that every lease agreement between the Authority and a state
agency be approved by the Senate President or the Speaker of the Assembly since neither House
had the ability to delegate its authority to legislate to such a "smaller body." Id. Thus, he
concluded that "Inleither house of the Legislature may create effective legislation alone nor ...
delegate essential executive or legislative duties to" legislative officials. Id. at 417, 448 A.2d at
459 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring).
Id. at 411, 448 A.2d at 456-57 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring). The dissent found
that the two purposes of the presentment clause were to preclude legislative overreaching of
executive power and to prevent hurried or unwise legislation. Id. at 417, 448 A.2d at 460
(Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring). The dissent found that the legislative review mechanism in this case mandated the use of the presentment clause in order to be constitutionally valid,
but that prior approval of a project by the Governor before submission to the legislature failed to
fulfill this requirement, since the Constitution required that the Governor act after the legislature. Id. at 418, 448 A.2d at 460 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring).
Justice Schreiber criticized the Act's requirement that the legislature affirmatively approve
projects costing in excess of $100,000. Id. at 420, 448 A.2d at461 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and
concurring). He contrasted this measure with the validation of the Executive Reorganization Act
in Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 297 A.2d 572 (1972), where legislative inaction resulted in
automatic approval of the Govenor's reorganization plans and affirmative action by the legislature in the form of a concurrent resolution was only required if the legislature decided to
disapprove the plan. 90 N.J. at 420, 448 A.2d at 461 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring).
Justice Schreiber commented, however, that other constitutionally acceptable mechanisms were
available which would allow legislative oversight. Id.
Id. at 421, 448 A.2d at 461 (Schreiber, J., dissenting and concurring).
176 Id. at 395, 448 A.2d at 448.
Id. at 379, 448 A.2d at 439; see, e.g., Enourato 90 N.J. at 408, 448 A.2d at 455.
173

114

175

177
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ing the constitutionality of legislative vetoes. Although the Legislative
Oversight Act contained constitutional flaws, a number of factors
emerge which indicate that a legislative veto mechanism broader than
that validated in Enourato should be found constitutional and should
be preserved as an effective means of oversight.
Efficient government operation requires the legislature to make
broad delegations of power to the Executive. 178 This necessary delegation of power has been validated because the separation of powers
doctrine permits some blending of power among the branches of
government to facilitate effective operation. 179 Despite this constitutionally permissible delegation, the legislature cannot totally shift its
responsibility of lawmaking but must provide sufficient standards for
the Executive to implement the law. 180 It is undesirable, however, for
the legislature to enact narrow statutory schemes because agencies are
better equipped to gather information and to seek the counsel of
experts in formulating comprehensive regulations in compliance with
the legislature's enunciated standards. 181

See Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) ("Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not
become a futility"); General Assembly, 90 N.J. at 392, 448 A.2d at 447; Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J.
117, 123-24, 93 A.2d 385, 388 (1952). See generally Cooper & Cooper, supra note 1, at 498;
Larsen, supra note 1, at 2; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 353.
119See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("a hermetic sealing off of the three branches
of government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of
governing itself effectively"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(observing that Constitution "contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into
a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity"); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1066-67 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (Constitution allows flexibility in apportionment of power among
branches of government); Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 388, 431 A.2d 833, 840 (1981); State
v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 370, 375 A.2d 607, 612 (1977) (separation of powers doctrine does not
bar cooperative action among branches of government) Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 11, 297
A.2d 572, 578 (1972) ("the [separation of powers] doctrine necessarily assumes that branches will
coordinate to the end that government will fulfill its mission") (citations omitted and emphasis
added). See generally Cooper & Cooper, supra note 1, at 506; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 374.
110Mount Laurel Township v. Department of the Public Advocate, 83 N.J. 522, 416 A.2d 886
(1980) (legislative delegation of power to government agency must have standards); Cammarata
v. Essex County Park Comm'n, 26 N.J. 404, 410, 140 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1958).
"IlSee, e.g., Boiler Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138, 151, 183 A.2d 64, 71 (1962)
(recognizing that "public interest is better served by delegating a large part of detailed lawmaking to the expert administrator, controlled by policies, objects and standards laid down by the
legislature, rather than by having all the details spelled out through the traditional legislative
process"); Cammarata v. Essex County Park Comm'n, 26 N.J. 404, 410, 140 A.2d 397, 400
(1958).
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When the legislature delegates rulemaking power to an agency, it
82
If
is empowering the agency to function in a legislative capacity.
this sharing of legislative power is consonant with the separation of
powers doctrine, then the legislative veto should be valid for the same
reason. 83 Therefore, correctly designed to preclude interference with
power that belongs exclusively to the Executive, a veto provision could
restore control over a broad delegation of legislative power.
The Legislative Oversight Act failed in this respect because it
obliterated executive authority in the administration of the law. The
Act allowed the legislature to gain complete control in both lawmaking and law enforcement, thereby unconstitutionally increasing legislative power. The executive branch was foreclosed from performing
an integral role in the administration of the law and the Executive's
power was impaired when the presentment clause was circumvented.
The way to eliminate this constitutional impediment is to "add"
the Executive back into the Legislative Oversight Act. 18 4 The New

182 See Atkins, 556 F.2d at 1068 (executive officer merely acts as agent of legislature in
carrying out delegated powers); Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138, 151-52, 183 A.2d
64 (1962) ("Administrative rule-making remains in essence, however, the enactment of legislation of general application prospective in nature"); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kandle, 105 N.J.
Super. 104, 113, 251 A.2d 295 (App. Div.), aff'd, 54 N.J. 11,252 A.2d 403 (1969) (observing that
"[iln its rulemaking capacity, an administrative agency is nothing more than a minor legislative
body considering proposed legislation under a grant of power"); Terry v. Harris, 175 N.J. Super.
482, 420 A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1980) (when acting under grant of power to deal with proposed
regulations, administrative agency is considered minor legislative body). But see Consumer
Energy, 673 F.2d at 474 (rulemaking is executive function, therefore, Congress is prohibited
from substantial interference in rulemaking process).
183 Cooper & Cooper, supra note 1, at 503; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 374. At least one state
supreme court justice takes this position. See State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 780
(Ala. Sup. Ct. 1980) (Boochever, J., dissenting).
184 Of course, one solution to the dilemma created is the passage of a state constitutional
amendment affording the legislature veto power over agency regulatory schemes. An amendment would take the responsibility for determining the constitutionality of legislative veto
provisions on an ad hoc basis out of the hands of the judiciary. In fact, on July 22, 1982, the day
the decision in General Assembly was rendered, Senator Zane introduced a proposed amendment to the New Jersey Constitution which would validate the use of a legislative veto to annul
agency rules. See S. Con. Res. 133, 200 Leg., 1st Sess. (1982). The proposed amendment states:
No rule or regulation made by any department, officer, agency or authority of this
State, except such as relates to the organization or internal management of the State
Government or a part thereof, shall take effect until it is filed either with the
Secretary of State or in such other manner as may be provided by law. The Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such rules and regulations. In
accordancewith such rules as it may adopt, the Legislature may invalidateany rule
or regulation, in whole or part, and may prohibit any proposed rule or regulation, in
whole or in part, by a majority of the authorized membership of each House.
Id. (italicized portions indicate proposed amendment to N.J. CONST. art. V, § IV, para. 6.)
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Jersey Supreme Court's test set forth in General Assembly delineates
that "[w]here legislative action is necessary to further a statutory
scheme requiring cooperation between the two branches, and such
action offers no substantial potential to interfere with exclusive executive functions or alter the statute's purposes, legislative veto power can
pass constitutional muster." 81 5 A statutory veto mechanism applicable
to more than one agency '8 which would allow for increased participation by the Executive should be found constitutional. Drawing
from the General Assembly test, the revised act will require that the
Executive first have an opportunity to veto proposed rules. 87 If the
Executive approves of the rules, he would submit them to the legislature along with a written statement setting forth his reasons for approval. The legislature could then review the regulations and the
considerations set forth in the Governor's statement. Disapproval
could be expressed through a concurrent resolution. If the legislature
disapproved the regulations, it would prepare a statement setting
forth its reasons for disapproval. This statement could afford the
judiciary a basis for review of the legislature's activity to ensure that
the legislature continues to act in accordance with original statutory
intent. 88 The proposed amendment to the statute should read as
follows:
Similar action has been taken by the Michigan Legislature, which adopted an amendment
that permits a legislative committee to review proposed agency regulations. MICH. CONST. art.
IV, § 37. Accordingly, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.245 (West 1981) provides for a joint
committee on administrative rules which can either approve or disapprove of a rule. Id. §
24.245(5), (6). If the committee expresses disapproval or reaches an impasse, this suspends the
implementation of the rule unless the committee subsequently approves the rule or the legislature
adopts a concurrent resolution approving the rule within 60 days. Approval by either the joint
committee on administrative rules or adoption of a concurrent resolution of approval by the
legislature, permits the agency to adopt the rule. Id. § 24.245(9).
185 90 N.J. at 395, 448 A.2d at 448 (emphasis added).
...Enourato permits statutory veto provisions applicable to individual agencies. In drafting
such veto provisions, the legislature should consider the guidelines of Enourato. If the statutory
veto permits the Governor an ample opportunity to express his views, is limited to a particular
project, and its repeated use is unlikely to nullify legislative intent, the veto will be valid. Id. at
405-07, 448 A.2d at 453-54. The validation of the legislative veto in a narrow context permits the
legislature to achieve review in a piecemeal fashion. Accordingly, pursuant to Enourato, the
legislature may implement the veto in areas where it perceives that the need for oversight is
great.
187 Cf. Enourato, 90 N.J. at 405, 448 A.2d at 453 (noting that Governor's initial approval of
projects guaranteed executive control).
"8 Thus, the judiciary would serve as a check upon irrational or unwarranted use of the
legislative veto. Since agency regulations are presumptively valid, see, e.g., New Jersey Ass'n of
Health Care Facilities v. Finley, 83 N.J. 67, 79, 415 A.2d 1147, 1153 (1980); Cole Nat'l Corp. v.
State Bd. of Examiners, 57 N.J. 227, 231, 271 A.2d 421, 423 (1970), and the courts will be bound
by this rule when reviewing regulations, the legislature will be deterred from misusing the veto
power. If the legislature's sentiments have changed since the legislation at issue was passed, and
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In those instances where the legislature delegates broad rulemaking
power to an agency, the agency's rules shall first be approved by
the Executive. Following submission to the legislature with a statement of reasons for approval, a rule shall be deemed approved
unless within 60 days of the submission thereof, the Senate and
General Assembly adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval.
The legislature shall then prepare a statement of reasons for disapproval, and submit same to the agency. 1 9

Because the above proposed statutory amendment preserves the Executive's active participation in the rulemaking process, it conforms
with the separation of powers doctrine. Interference with the executive branch is minimized, since the legislature has no opportunity to
review rules unless they are first approved by the Executive. 190 The
integrity of the presentment clause is also preserved through the active
participation of the Executive in preparing a statement setting forth
the reasons which he considers important to merit the validation of
the proposed regulations.
An important concern in the implementation of a legislative veto
is the legislature's capacity to disapprove of any part of a regulatory
scheme. 191 Since under the proposed amendment, however, the legis-

it attempts to make policy changes through the veto power rather than by amendment, judicial
review may force the hand of the legislature to make the appropriate amendment by finding the
regulation valid. Thus, judicial review would provide a check upon unwarranted aggrandizement of power by the legislature under the proposed act. See generally Schwartz, Some Recent
Administrative Law Trends: Delegations and Judicial Review 1982 Wis. L. REv. 208.
189In contrast, N.J. STAT. ANN § 52:14B-4.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983) was drafted as
follows:
A rule shall be deemed approved unless within 60 days of the submission thereof, the
Senate and General Assembly adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving the rule,
in whole or in part, or providing that the rule not take effect during the 60 days
following the date of the adoption of the resolution, during which time they may
nevertheless adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving the rule. No action may be
taken by the Legislature under this section until after I calendar day from the date of
the standing reference committee's report.
190 For example, in Enourato, the court noted with approval that "the Governor's full control
over the initial selection of Building Authority projects makes it impossible for the legislature to
usurp executive authority in ways that were possible under the Legislative Oversight Act. The
legislature has absolutely no control over authority projects unless the Governor first approves
them." 90 N.J. at 405, 448 A.2d at 235.
191This aspect of the veto's application to agency rulemaking is troubling. Commentary,
however, indicates that the argument is not significant in light of the consideration that most
legislative activity has the potential to disrupt agency schemes. Cooper & Cooper, supra note 1,
argue that:
Basically all oversight interferes with execution; indeed, it cannot avoid doing so.
When Congress passes a piece of amendatory legislation, reduces an appropriation,
conducts an investigation, formally or informally requires prior reporting, criticizes
administrators on the floor or contacts them on behalf of constituents, it involves
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lature must prepare a statement of reasons for disapproval, this could
be reviewed by the judicial branch which would deter the legislature
92
from arbitrarily disapproving any part of a regulatory scheme.
Another safeguard against disruption is the amendment's limited
scope. The statute would apply only to future rulemaking. This prevents the annulment of individual rules that are contained in coherent
regulatory schemes already in operation. Additionally, the proposed
statutory veto would only apply to regulations passed pursuant to
broad enabling statutes. This ensures that the legislative veto will only
be operative in circumstances where the executive branch has been
delegated broad legislative power.
A second approach to the implementation of a legislative veto is
to require that the legislature disapprove of a proposed rule by a twothirds majority of each House. This proposed amendment to the Act is
no different from the foregoing proposal except that it will require
more than a majority concurrence to annul regulations. A rule would
first be subjected to Executive approval and then to a two-thirds
majority of each House to invalidate it. Since the device makes it more
difficult for the legislature to express disapproval, it ensures that any
interference with the execution of the law will only occur when the
legislature has serious objections to the rule as a means of effectuating
statutory policy. Increased executive participation combined with the
requirement that the disapproval be adopted by a two-thirds majority
of each House preserves the purpose of the presentment clause. This
proposal allows the executive branch to continue its essential role of
administration of the law without aggrandizing the power of the
legislature. Thus, the separation of powers goal-that the branches
coordinate to the extent necessary to govern effectively-is advanced.
Joan Mary Schwab

itself in the administrative process and interferes with what has been going on or
what would go on if it had not stepped into the process.
Id. at 493.
The authors further argue that:
[I]nterference in the administrative process is the price of legislative oversight and
the veto is not so different in this regard, either in terms of the kind or effect of its
interference, to be singled out as unconstitutional. The fact that the veto can provide
more effective control in certain areas does not mean that its effect in terms of tying
an administrator's hands is basically different from what is accomplished through a
weapon such as appropriations.
Id. at 498.
'9 See supra note 188.

